State v. Karen A. Connery, Nos. 15-155, 156 (June 8, 2016) | 15-155, 156 | he defendant, Karen A. Connery, appealed from two judgments of conviction rendered after a jury-waived trial held in Providence County Superior Court. She was found guilty of simple assault and willful trespass. On appeal, the defendant contended that, with respect to the conviction of simple assault, her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. She also contended that, with respect to the conviction of willful trespass, that offense is not a lesser-included offense of breaking and entering.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that her contention to the effect that her constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated had been waived. The Supreme Court also held that her contention concerning willful trespass had been waived.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court. |  | Yendelby Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc., d/b/a Monet Lounge and John Doe, No. 15-300 (June 7, 2016) | 15-300 | The plaintiff, Yendelby Santos (plaintiff or Santos), appealed from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to vacate final judgment in favor of the defendants, D. Laikos, Inc., d/b/a Monet Lounge and John Doe (defendants), on his personal injury claim. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in not granting his motion to vacate on the grounds of excusable neglect and erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he asserted that he did not receive notice of the defendants’ motion to dismiss his complaint on statute of limitations grounds, and thus did not attend the hearing on said motion. The plaintiff also averred that his complaint erroneously included an incident date that was beyond the three-year statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to vacate because there were no extraordinary circumstances surrounding his failure to attend the motion to dismiss hearing that amounted to excusable neglect. The Supreme Court also held that the hearing justice properly denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
|  | Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc. et al., No. 14-284 (June 3, 2016) | 14-284 | Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. (Cashman) filed a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari, in which it stated that it was seeking review of the May 13, 2014 denial in Providence County Superior Court of its motion to compel the production from Cardi Corporation, Inc. (Cardi) of the following: “all materials and documents, less core attorney work product, including all computer models and drafts of materials and documents, developed and considered by [Cardi’s] testifying expert * * * in the process of formulating his written expert opinions * * *.” In a November 20, 2014 order, the Supreme Court granted Cashman’s petition. Cashman contended before the Supreme Court that the hearing justice erred in denying its motion because, in Cashman’s view, materials which are considered by a testifying expert in formulating his or her opinion are discoverable, with the exception of “core attorney work product.” According to Cashman, it was, therefore, error for the hearing justice to refuse to compel Cardi to produce the requested documents. |  | Michael Morse v. Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence, No. 13-252 (June 6, 2016) | 13-0252 | The petitioner, Michael Morse, sought review, pursuant to a writ of certiorari, of a decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence (the board), dated July 24, 2013. In its decision, the board denied Morse’s application for accidental disability retirement. The petitioner argued that the decision should have been quashed because it was based solely on the fact that he did not satisfy the board’s self-imposed “unanimity rule,” requiring that all three physicians who examined Morse agree that the applicant was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. The petitioner argued that the unanimity rule was contrary to the plain language of the city’s ordinance on accidental disability retirement and that the board’s adoption of the rule effectively abdicated its discretion to review applications to a single disagreeing physician. The board argued that the Supreme Court should affirm its decision because the unanimity rule is required by the plain language of the ordinance and by legislative history. |  | State v. Sharif K. Fairweather, No. 15-123 (June 3, 2016) | 15-123 | The defendant, Sharif K. Fairweather, sought review of a Superior Court judgment that declared him to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. That judgment revoked the suspension of seventy-two months of a longer suspended sentence.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the hearing justice erred in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation; he also contended that the seventy-two-month sentence imposed by the hearing justice was “excessive.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in adjudicating the defendant to be a probation violator. The Supreme Court also held that the hearing justice’s execution of seventy-two months of the defendant’s suspended sentence was not “excessive” and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | Joseph Hall et al. v. City of Newport et al., No. 15-259 (June 2, 2016) | 15-259 | The plaintiffs, Joseph Hall, his wife, Marilyn Hall, and their children, Jacob and Philomena Hall (the Halls), appealed from the April 9, 2015 entry of partial final judgment (pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure) in favor of the defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA), in Newport County Superior Court. The partial final judgment was entered as a result of the Superior Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Halls contended on appeal that the hearing justice erred in granting RIPTA’s motion for summary judgment because issues of material fact remained in the case.
The Supreme Court held that RIPTA owed a duty of care to the Halls. It further held that there were issues of fact present in the case that required determination by a fact-finder. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the hearing justice’s grant of RIPTA’s motion for summary judgment. |  | State v. John Benoit, No. 14-354 (June 1, 2016) | 14-354 | This case is before the Court on appeal by the defendant, John Benoit, from judgment after a jury convicted him on one count of entering an apartment with the intent to commit larceny. The defendant received a four-year sentence, with eighteen months to serve and thirty months suspended, with thirty months of probation. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by: (1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, based on his assertion that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to commit larceny at the time he entered the apartment; and (2) denying his motion for mistrial and for a cautionary instruction.
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying both motions. First, the Court held that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, while giving full credibility to its witnesses, and drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt, there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant entered the apartment with the requisite intent to commit larceny. Second, the Court held that a responding officer’s testimony that he was responding to a “possible burglary in progress” was not so prejudicial that it required granting the defendant’s motion for a mistrial or his request for a cautionary instruction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |  | State v. Ricardo Florez, No. 14-280 (May 27, 2016) | 14-280 | The defendant, Ricardo Florez, appealed from a judgment of conviction after having been found guilty by a jury of one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (sexual contact with a person fourteen years of age or under) in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4. The defendant asserted a variety of issues on appeal. First, he contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Next, he asserted that the trial justice’s jury charge and verdict sheet were flawed in that they permitted the jury to return a non-unanimous guilty verdict. Third, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by allowing the state to improperly refresh the complainant’s recollection. Finally, he contended that the trial justice committed reversible error by declining to admit parts of the witness statement of the complainant’s father into evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion for a new trial because it was filed beyond the ten-day deadline following the jury verdict. The Court also held that the defendant waived any claim regarding the jury instructions and verdict form by failing to object in the Superior Court. Next, the Supreme Court concluded that the state did not attempt to refresh the complainant’s recollection as the defendant suggested; instead, the Court held that the record showed that the trial justice properly allowed the state to impeach the complainant using a prior inconsistent statement. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the record showed that the defendant abandoned his attempt at introducing parts of the witness statement of the complainant’s father into evidence; thus, the trial justice did not improperly exclude the use of that statement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction. |  | State v. Jose A. Breton, No. 14-149 (May 27, 2016) | 14-149 | After a jury convicted the defendant, Jose A. Breton, of two counts of assault, he filed a motion for a new trial which the trial justice denied. It is from that ruling that the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice misconstrued the evidence when he found the complaining witness to be a more credible witness than the alibi witnesses produced by the defendant. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err when he denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the trial justice acted well within his discretion when he found the state’s witnesses to be credible, despite any inconsistencies in their testimony. He reviewed the complaining witness’s testimony and explained his reasons for finding her credible and reliable. Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the trial justice specifically addressed her reliability when he considered the undisputed testimony about her tumultuous relationship with the defendant, her fear, and her hesitation to name him as her assailant. As for why he rejected the testimony of the defendant’s alibi witnesses, he explained that, although there was not any significant impeachment, when weighed against the complaining witness’s testimony, and the history of their relationship, he did not disagree with the jury’s conclusion not to accept it. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice complied with the appropriate procedure and articulated adequate reasons for denying the defendant’s motion. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |  | In the Matter of B.H., Nos. 13-364, 14-19 (May 26, 2016) | 13-364, 14-19 | The respondent, B.H., appeals from adjudications of delinquency entered in the Family Court. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish sexual penetration—an essential element of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, of which the respondent was found delinquent. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the two complainants that, at the respondent’s instruction, their penises went “in” and “inside” the respondent’s “butt” was insufficient to establish sexual penetration. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to Family Court with directions to enter adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation sexual assault and for resentencing. |  | Antonio Ribeiro v. The Rhode Island Eye Institute, et al., Nos. 13-297, 13-298, 13-299 (May 10, 2016) | 13-297, 298, 299 | The plaintiff, Antonio Ribeiro, filed a medical malpractice suit against his optometrist, Dr. Martin Newman, and Dr. Newman’s employer, the Rhode Island Eye Institute, LLC. At trial, Ribeiro argued that Dr. Newman had breached the duty of care owed to him because he failed to diagnose a detached retina and that that negligence had resulted in a permanent vision loss in Ribeiro’s right eye. Ribeiro also sought to hold the Eye Institute vicariously liable for Dr. Newman’s negligence. At the close of Ribeiro’s case, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Ribeiro had failed to meet his burden of proving that there had been a deviation from the standard of care, proximate causation, and damages. The trial justice took the motions under advisement and the defendants proceeded with their case. After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding that, although Dr. Newman had violated the standard of care in treating Ribeiro, that violation was not the cause of Ribeiro’s vision loss. All parties then filed posttrial motions. Ribeiro moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial justice erred by restricting his causation expert’s trial testimony. The defendants renewed their motions for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, moved for a new trial on the issue of standard of care. The trial justice denied all posttrial motions; and the parties, having timely appealed and cross-appealed, appeared before the Supreme Court arguing that the trial justice erred in denying their respective motions. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice impermissibly limited the testimony of Ribeiro’s causation expert. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial on all issues. Because neither of the defendants renewed their Rule 50 motion at the close of all the evidence, but instead waited until after the jury returned its verdict to renew that motion, the Supreme Court held that the defendants waived their ability to challenge the ruling on appeal. Finally, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the defendants’ appeal of the denial of their motion for a new trial because the plaintiff’s appeal was sustained and a new trial was already granted on all issues. |  | Patrick T. Conley v. Paul Fontaine, et al., No. 15-48 (May 9, 2016) | 15-48 | The plaintiff appealed from a Providence County Superior Court judgment denying his Motion for Entry of Default and Final Decree and granting Bank of New York Mellon’s Motion to File a Late Answer as well as its request to redeem the property. The plaintiff contended that the trial justice lacked the discretionary authority to grant the defendant’s Motion to File a Late Answer because the defendant had not filed its answer on or before the twentieth day after receipt of the plaintiff’s petition to foreclose the defendant’s right of redemption to the Burrillville property at issue; he further contended that the trial justice erred in allowing the Bank to redeem the just-referenced property.
The Supreme Court held that, assuming without deciding whether a motion to file a late answer could be properly entertained by the court after the return date, such a motion would have been unavailing in the instant case—due to the fact that, as indicated by counsel for the Bank, he had no “explanation for why [the documents] were inadvertently misplaced.” The Court also held that the defendant should not have been permitted to redeem the property. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | Bryan Joachim v. Straight Line Productions, LLC et al., Nos. 2013-149, 13-227 (May 6, 2016) | 13-149, 13-227 | These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court after the Superior Court entered an order of dismissal as a sanction for the mid-trial production of certain documents and denied the plaintiff, Bryan Joachim’s (plaintiff or Joachim), motion to vacate such order. On appeal, Joachim set forth a myriad of arguments to support his contentions that the hearing justice erred in (1) dismissing the case pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) denying his motion to vacate the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that, while Rule 37(b)(2) requires the plaintiff to violate an order as a prerequisite for dismissal, a trial justice has authority under Rule 37(d) to dismiss an action in the absence of such an order when a party commits certain discovery violations. In addition, the Supreme Court held that it was within the trial justice’s discretion to impose a sanction of dismissal based upon the discovery violation in this case and the plaintiff’s subsequent conduct in dealing with that discovery violation. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the case was properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 37(d). The Supreme Court also concluded that the various arguments presented in Joachim’s Rule 60(b) motion to vacate were meritless, and, therefore, the trial justice properly denied that motion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | State v. Ray Burgess, No. 13-278 (April 29, 2016) | 13-278.txt | After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant, Ray Burgess, was convicted of one count of possession of cocaine. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress. Accepting the state’s concession that the police immediately arrested the defendant upon his emergence from a restaurant, the Supreme Court held that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the arrest was not supported by probable cause where the tip from a first-time informant who police had discovered was the subject of an outstanding warrant was devoid of predictive detail and failed to indicate the informant’s basis of knowledge of the alleged criminal activity and where police failed to corroborate or independently investigate the bare-bones tip. Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant’s conviction. |  | Tracy Gregoire et al. v. Baird Properties, LLC et al., No. 14-261 (April 26, 2016) | 14-261 | The defendants, Baird Properties, LLC, and Michael Baird, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of Tracy Gregoire and Mark Traynor in an action brought under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 18 of title 34. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-landlord purposely disrupted utility services to the property where the plaintiffs resided in order to force them to vacate the premises. After a bench trial, the trial justice entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendants challenged several findings of fact made by the trial justice, including: that the plaintiffs had not intended to vacate the property when they left on December 10, 2012, that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the plaintiffs and Baird Properties, that Baird caused the deficient conditions, that Baird threatened to shut off the electricity and water, that Baird was on the property on December 10, 2012, to tamper with the electrical system, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was reasonable. Citing to the definitions provided within the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, the Supreme Court held that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Baird Properties and the plaintiffs. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice had not overlooked or misconceived material evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong in his factual findings as there was ample evidence on the record to support his findings, including testimony from the plaintiffs, the building official, and the building inspector. Finally, the Supreme Court held that there were no grounds to disturb the trial justice’s finding that the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $22,750 was reasonable because the plaintiffs’ counsel had provided an affidavit from an experienced attorney attesting to its reasonableness and an itemized list outlining the work performed and because the defendants had provided no contradicting evidence or affidavit when given the opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
|  | State v. Mustapha Bojang, No. 14-269 (April 26, 2016) | 14-269 | The defendant, Mustapha Bojang, appealed from a Superior Court judgment convicting him of first-degree child molestation. In the defendant’s first appeal—State v. Bojang, 83 A.3d 526 (R.I. 2014)—the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction on two of the three grounds on which he claimed the trial justice had committed reversible error. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court on the third issue—whether the defendant’s confession during an unrecorded portion of his interrogation at the Woonsocket Police Department should have been suppressed as involuntary due to the alleged employment of impermissibly coercive tactics. The case was remanded to the trial justice for additional findings of fact and credibility determinations regarding the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. After the trial justice made the additional findings of fact and conclusions regarding credibility, the trial justice again denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession. The defendant appealed again from the judgment entered against him. |  | 5750 Post Road Medical Offices, LLC et al. v. East Greenwich Fire District et al., No. 14-169 (April 26, 2016) | 14-169 | In 2002 the Board of Fire Commissioners of the East Greenwich Fire District (fire district) adopted a resolution imposing development impact fees on developers who applied for a building permit to develop land within the Town of East Greenwich. Five corporate plaintiffs sued the fire district and the Town of East Greenwich, alleging that the defendants’ imposition and collection of development impact fees pursuant to this resolution violated Rhode Island’s Development Impact Fee Act (RIDIFA), G.L. 1956 chapter 22.4 of title 45. A hearing justice of the Superior Court resolved the case on cross-motions for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had not had the authority to impose development impact fees. In the alternative, they contended that, even if the defendants had had the requisite authority to impose the fees, the process by which they imposed the fees was deficient and the fees were therefore not properly collected. The Supreme Court held that it was not required to examine the exact parameters of the fire district’s authority to impose the development impact fees because the fire district no longer existed as an independent corporate municipal entity; rather, its charter had been revoked and it became a subordinate agency of the Town of East Greenwich. The Supreme Court also held that the resolution imposing the development impact fees was in violation of RIDIFA’s strict mandate that the impact fees be imposed through an ordinance and that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the fire district had not followed the Town of East Greenwich’s regulations regarding the procedures for adopting a new ordinance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
|  | State v. Robert Beaudoin, No. 12-325 (April 26, 2016) | 12-325 | The defendant, Robert Beaudoin, appealed from a judgment finding him to be in violation of the terms of his probation and sentencing him to serve two years of a previously imposed suspended sentence. On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearing justice “clearly erred” in finding that he violated the conditions of his probation on the basis of the evidence presented by the state. The defendant averred that the hearing justice’s findings of fact were arbitrary and capricious, maintaining that “they were unsupported by the facts adduced at the hearing.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court noted that the hearing justice had thoroughly assessed the evidence presented at the hearing and that he had issued a bench decision explaining why he was reasonably satisfied that the defendant had failed to keep the peace and remain of good behavior. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the credibility determinations of the hearing justice and, accordingly, affirmed the adjudication of probation violation.
|  | State v. Robert Beaudoin, No. 13-254 (April 26, 2016) | 13-254 | In 2009, the defendant, Robert Beaudoin, entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of felony assault and was sentenced to fifteen years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, five months to serve and the remaining 175 months suspended with probation. In 2012, a Superior Court trial justice, after holding an evidentiary hearing, declared the defendant to be a probation violator and ordered him to serve two years of the suspended sentence that was imposed in 2009. After a jury trial on the charges that gave rise to the probation violation proceeding, the defendant was acquitted in 2013. Meanwhile, in 2010, the General Assembly amended G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18, see P.L. 2010, ch. 311, § 1, and added subsections (b) and (c) to that statute, thereby effectively mandating the defendant’s release from imprisonment after his acquittal. The defendant moved for relief under § 12-19-18(b). The trial justice denied the motion, concluding that the statute could not be applied retroactively and further declaring that the amendment was unconstitutional even when applied prospectively. The Supreme Court held that this case involved a prospective, not retroactive, application of § 12-19-18(b) because all three events that triggered the statute’s application—(1) an evidentiary hearing; (2) the adjudication of probation violation and the imprisonment of the defendant on his previously imposed suspended sentence as a result of that adjudication; and (3) the subsequent acquittal on the underlying charges—occurred after the effective date of the amendment to § 12-19-18. Additionally, the Court determined that, because neither party raised the issue of the constitutionality of § 12-19-18(b) when applied prospectively, the trial justice was without authority to decide it. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. |  | James F. Nuzzo v. Nuzzo Campion Stone Enterprises, Inc. f/k/a Corriveault Holdings, Inc., Nos. 15-132, 15-133 (April 21, 2016) | 15-132,133 | James F. Nuzzo, the plaintiff, appealed from a July 2, 2014 judgment entered subsequent to a jury-waived trial in the Providence County Superior Court. Mr. Nuzzo contended that the trial justice erred with respect to his conclusion that Mr. Nuzzo was not entitled to commissions on orders that were placed before his termination, but paid for by customers of Nuzzo Campion Stone Enterprises, Inc., the defendant corporation, after his termination. Mr. Nuzzo also contended that the trial justice erred with respect to his decision in favor of the defendant corporation on its counterclaim.
The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in his ruling concerning the plaintiff’s claim for commissions because the language in the operative agreement was clear and unambiguous in providing that the plaintiff was not entitled to commissions on orders placed before his termination but not actually paid for until after his termination. The Court also held that the language contained in the written agreement constituted the sort of agreed-to departure from the general rule relative to commissions that the Court has expressly indicated would be permissible. Lastly, the Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s findings with respect to the defendant’s counterclaim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | In re Kyle A., No. 14-307 (April 15, 2016) | 14-307 | The respondent, Kyle A., appealed from an adjudication that he was delinquent for engaging in second-degree child molestation sexual assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.3. On appeal, the respondent argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial justice’s finding that he touched the complainant for the purposes of sexual gratification and, therefore, it was error to adjudicate him delinquent for violating § 11 37 8.3. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she found that the respondent had touched the thirteen-year-old complainant for the purposes of sexual gratification when he entered the room where she was sleeping, reached under her blanket, reached into her shorts, and touched her vagina through her underwear. For that reason, the Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication of the Family Court.
|  | Joseph Lemerise v. The Commerce Insurance Company, No. 14-244 (April 13, 2016) | 14-244 | The plaintiff, Joseph Lemerise, appealed from an order of the Superior Court that (1) denied his motion to confirm an arbitration award of $197,550, including prejudgment interest; and (2) granted a motion of the defendant, The Commerce Insurance Company, to modify the award to conform to the limits of the uninsured-motorist coverage of the plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy. Before the Superior Court, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice had no authority to modify the award, under the Rhode Island Arbitration Act, codified at G.L. 1956 chapter 3 of title 10. The plaintiff further argued that the Arbitration Act prohibited the trial justice from conducting the type of de novo review of the arbitration award that the defendant sought to elicit when it subpoenaed the arbitrator and submitted exhibits not before the arbitrator, including the insurance policy. The defendant argued that the court should modify the award and introduced testimony of the arbitrator to support its claim that the arbitrator was asked only to determine the amount of damages that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover from the tortfeasor, and not the extent of the insurer’s liability. The trial justice agreed with the defendant that the arbitration award should be modified to conform to the liability limit of $100,000 contained in the insurance policy that it submitted into evidence during the hearing before the Superior Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to confirm the arbitration award and in granting the defendant’s motion to modify the award. The plaintiff pressed the same arguments that were presented to the trial justice. The defendant argued that the trial justice had the authority to modify the award because it was an insurance policy executed pursuant to Massachusetts law and the arbitrator, in including prejudgment interest, awarded on a matter not submitted to him.
On review, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial justice and directed that an order should enter confirming the arbitration award. The Court determined that the trial justice had no authority to order the modification of the arbitration award. Section 10-3-14 provided very narrow grounds upon which a trial justice may modify an award, none of which were at issue in this case. The Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Wheeler v. Encompass Insurance Co., 66 A.3d 477 (R.I. 2013), wherein it denounced the de novo type review conducted by a trial justice when he modified an arbitrator’s award to conform to the limits of an insurance policy that had not been submitted to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court additionally determined that it was patently erroneous for the trial justice to hear new evidence and to consider documents not submitted to the arbitrator, when the Arbitration Act grants the trial justice essentially appellate level review of an arbitration decision. Finally, the Court decided that, after conducting the appropriate review, pursuant to § 10-3-14, there were no grounds for modifying the award. The defendant’s arguments to conform the award to the policy and Massachusetts law were not submitted to the arbitrator and, therefore, waived before the trial justice and the Supreme Court. The arbitrator determined the reasonable compensation that he believed the plaintiff was entitled to recover from Commerce, the named party to the arbitration proceeding, and had the authority to calculate and include prejudgment interest in the award. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the trial justice and directed the Superior Court to enter an order confirming the arbitration award. |  | State v. Daniel Hunt, No. 14-195 (March 12, 2016) | 14-195 | The defendant, Daniel Hunt, was charged with two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted on count 1 and acquitted on count 2. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when, in his instructions to the jury and in the jury-verdict form, he failed to adequately inform the jury of the distinction between counts 1 and 2, which were identically worded. The defendant contended that he was not adequately informed of the charge of which he was convicted. The Supreme Court concluded that, since the defendant failed to seek a bill of particulars, he should not be heard to complain about the lack of notice of the specificity of the charge. The Court further deemed that the defendant’s argument was waived because he failed to object to the jury instructions or the contents of the jury-verdict form at trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | State v. Alicia Williams, No. 14-216 (April 11, 2016) | 14-216 | The defendant, Alicia Williams (Williams or defendant), appealed her conviction of one count of assault with a dangerous weapon following a jury trial in Newport County Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice improperly barred testimony from one of the responding police officers to the effect that she was “scared” of the complaining witness. The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to lay a proper foundation to allow the testifying officer to conclude that she was scared of the complaining witness and any such testimony was then properly excluded. The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice did not err in denying her motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction. |  | The Providence Journal Company et al. v. The Rhode Island Department of Public Safety, by and through Peter Kilmartin, Attorney General et al., No. 14-182 (April 11, 2016) | 14-182 | In this appeal, the Providence Journal Company and Amanda Milkovits (collectively the Journal or plaintiffs), sought review of an order granting summary judgment entered against them and in favor of the Rhode Island Department of Public Safety, the Rhode Island State Police, and Steven G. O’Donnell, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Rhode Island Department of Public Safety and Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police (collectively, defendants). The Journal filed suit in Providence County Superior Court alleging violations of Rhode Island’s Access to Public Records Act (APRA), G.L. 1956 chapter 2 of title 38, after they unsuccessfully requested records from the Rhode Island State Police concerning an investigation of an underage drinking incident at property owned by the then-Governor, Lincoln Chafee. On appeal, the Journal took issue with the Superior Court’s determination that disclosure of the requested documents “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and, thus, were not subject to public disclosure pursuant to the APRA. The Supreme Court determined that the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) in its interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act should apply to this case: namely, that the justification most likely to satisfy the APRA’s public interest requirement “is that the information is necessary to show the investigative agency or other responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties.” The Court concluded that the Journal had not produced any evidence to suggest that disclosure of the documents would reveal governmental impropriety or negligence and, consequently, such disclosure was unwarranted. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | State v. Tony Gonzalez, No. 13-289 (March 29, 2016) | 13-289 | The defendant, Tony Gonzalez, appealed from a conviction following a jury trial in Kent County Superior Court. The defendant was convicted of one count of murder in the first degree, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1; one count of assault with intent to commit murder, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-1; one count of “discharg[ing] a firearm while committing a crime of violence, to wit, murder, resulting in the death of Carl Cunningham, Jr.,” in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-3.2; and one count of “discharg[ing] a firearm while committing a crime of violence, to wit, assault with intent to commit murder,” in violation of § 11-47-3.2. On appeal, Mr. Gonzalez contended that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress certain evidence that was obtained as a result of his warrantless arrest in his home. He specifically posited that “neither exigent circumstances nor consent justified the failure of the * * * police to obtain a warrant * * *.” Mr. Gonzalez also argued on appeal that the trial justice erred in failing to “remove two biased jurors from the jury” or, in the alternative, grant a mistrial.
The Supreme Court held: (1) that the defendant’s mother did not consent to the entry of police into her home; (2) that her signing of a consent to search form was not free and voluntary; (3) that exigent circumstances were not present so as to justify a warrantless search; and (4) that the defendant’s signing of a consent to search form was not sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrest so as to be a valid consent. The Supreme Court went on to hold that the trial justice erred in failing to exclude the evidence at issue which was obtained as a result of the defendant’s warrantless arrest in his home because the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by that warrantless entry. Moreover, it was the judgment of the Court that the admission of the evidence at issue was not harmless error; and the Court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the allegedly biased jurors. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. |  | Estate of Richard J. Deeble v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation, No. 14-235 (March 24, 2016) | 14-235 | In this case of first impression, the Court was called upon to decide whether the right of first refusal to repurchase excess land condemned for highway purposes under article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution terminates upon the death of “the person or persons from whom such remainder was taken.” The plaintiff, the Estate of Richard J. Deeble, appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendant, the Rhode Island Department of Transportation, in which the Superior Court justice found that the preemptive right that was vested in Richard J. Deeble, the original condemnee, did not pass to his estate upon his death. Before the Court, the plaintiff argued that the right transcends the death of the original condemnee and subsequently passes to his or her heirs, successors, and assigns. After examining the plain language of article 6, section 19 and concluding the provision to be clear and unambiguous, the Court held that the phrase “the person or persons from whom such remainder was taken” connotes the original condemnee only and not his or her heirs, successors, or assigns at death. Because the right of first refusal held by Richard J. Deeble extinguished when he died and did not pass to the plaintiff, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. |  | Mark Van Hoesen et al. v. Lloyd’s of London, alias., Nos. 15-209, 15-227 (March 24, 2016) | 15-209,227 | The plaintiffs, Mark and Pamela Van Hoesen, appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London. Mr. Van Hoesen was injured in a fall after a deck railing gave way on July 23, 2012. Soon after the fall, Mr. Van Hoesen, along with his wife, Pamela, filed a complaint in Washington County Superior Court, alleging that a contractor, Brian Leonard, negligently constructed the deck. The complaint also asserted a claim of loss of consortium on behalf of Mrs. Van Hoesen. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Lloyd’s because she found that, because Lloyd’s canceled the policy for nonpayment several years before the injuries occurred, there was no insurance policy that covered the plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the hearing justice erred when she (1) failed to find that, as a matter of public policy, the terms of the contract insured the work of the building contractor who built the deck; and (2) failed to determine whether the terms of the insurance contract violated the statutory minimum for coverage requirements. Although prevailing below, Lloyd’s filed a cross-appeal in which it argued that the hearing justice erred when she denied its motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs improperly substituted Lloyd’s for the contractor and the original defendant, Brian Leonard.
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding the plain language in the insurance policy that would exclude any claim arising from Leonard’s negligence from coverage, the policy, if enforced as written, would contravene G.L. 1956 § 5-65-7(a), which requires that building contractors carry a minimum of $500,000 in general liability insurance. However, the defendant argued that the insurance policy they issued to Leonard was only in effect from March 8, 2007, to March 8, 2008, and was canceled on August 29, 2007—long before the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred—because Leonard had not paid the premiums. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that § 5-65-7(a) imposes a duty on an insurer to provide continuing coverage for a contractor’s work after the policy period expires. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that, in order for the policy to cover the plaintiffs’ injuries, the insurance policy required, by its unambiguous terms, that the “bodily injury” occur during the policy period. Because the injuries occurred after Lloyd’s canceled the policy due to nonpayment, the plaintiffs’ injuries were excluded from coverage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Because the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court did not reach the other arguments raised by the parties in the appeal and cross-appeal. |  | In re: The Janet S. Bagdis Living Trust Agreement Dated September 23, 1996, as amended on January 12, 2007 and July 26, 2008, No. 15-40 (March 24, 2016) | 15-40 | The self-represented appellant, Kimberly Bagdis, appealed from a Superior Court order that required attorneys’ fees be paid from her share of funds held in trust for her by her aunt, the defendant Lynne Wilson. Bagdis’s grandmother, Janet Bagdis, died on January 17, 2010. Before her death, she established an inter vivos trust and the named defendant Lynne Wilson as successor trustee. After Janet’s death, Wilson asked Bagdis to sign a release discharging her of her fiduciary duties and releasing her of any personal liability. In return for signing the release, Wilson would distribute Bagdis’s share of the trust to her. Wilson, on numerous occasions, attempted to contact Bagdis to discuss the distribution of these trust assets. After it became clear that Bagdis was not responding to Wilson’s overtures, Wilson retained the services of an attorney to advise her about the winding down of the trust. Eventually, Wilson learned that Bagdis’s refusal to sign the release was based on her belief that it required a “fraudulent attestation,” and that it was “illegal.” For that reason, Wilson filed a miscellaneous petition in the Providence Superior Court seeking permission to deposit Bagdis’s funds in the court registry so that she could wind down the administration of the trust, terminate it, and be released from her fiduciary duties.
Bagdis did not appear at the March 19, 2014, hearing on Wilson’s petition. Nonetheless, the trial justice ordered that the remaining trust assets be deposited into the court registry. Moreover, the trial justice ordered Wilson to file several other miscellaneous petitions including petitions for (1) approval of the first and final accountings; (2) termination of the trust; and (3) approval of attorneys’ fees. The trial justice scheduled those matters for a later hearing. Bagdis attended that hearing and expressed concerns over her aunt’s administration and accounting of the trust. The trial justice continued the matter until mid-August and, in the meantime, instructed Wilson to provide the court with a memorandum outlining Wilson’s ability to charge reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees against Bagdis’s share of the trust and to provide Bagdis with more information regarding certain expenses incurred during the trust administration. At Bagdis’s request, the hearing was rescheduled to September 17, 2014. After Bagdis emailed Wilson’s attorney confirming that the hearing would take place at 2 p.m. that day, Bagdis failed to appear. The trial justice heard argument from Wilson’s attorney and granted her motion to approve the accountings and the motion for attorneys’ fees. He also ordered that Wilson be released from her duties as trustee. That evening, Wilson’s attorney received an email from Bagdis stating that the matter was going to be heard the next day, September 18, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. The following morning, citing a scheduling error in the clerk’s communication with Bagdis, the Superior Court vacated its prior rulings and allowed Bagdis to be heard on the record. After hearing her concerns about reimbursements from the trust to Wilson and the attorneys’ fees, the trial justice granted both of Wilson’s motions. The trial justice found that the claimed attorneys’ fees were fair and reasonable and ordered that they be paid from Bagdis’s share of the trust. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bagdis argued that the trial justice made several reversible errors. First, she argued that the trial justice erred when he approved the first and final accounting and when he approved the payment of the settlor’s final debts and expenses, as well as administration costs, from the trust. Second, she argued that the trial justice erred when he discharged and released the trustee, Lynne Wilson, from her fiduciary duty because Wilson had breached that duty by administering the trust’s assets in an imprudent manner. Third, she contended that her due process rights were violated by the Superior Court. On review, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err when he approved the first and final accounting because the trust expressly authorized Wilson to pay the settlor’s final debts and expenses as well as administrative costs from the trust. Second, the Court held that the trial justice did not err when he discharged and released Wilson from her fiduciary duty because any delay in distributing the assets was due to Bagdis’s refusal to respond to Wilson or provide Wilson with a signed release and Wilson acted in a prudent manner when she placed Bagdis’s share of the trust in a cash account. Third, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion under G.L. 1956 § 18-6-2 when he ordered that Wilson’s attorneys’ fees be paid from Bagdis’s share of the trust assets. The Court determined that the statute authorizes a trial justice to order that funds be deposited in the court registry as well as order that a beneficiary pay the fiduciary’s attorneys’ fees when the beneficiary refuses to release the fiduciary of personal liability in exchange for receiving a share of the trust assets. Fourth and finally, the Supreme Court held that Bagdis’s due process rights were not violated because she received proper notice of the hearings and she was fully heard on her objections.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees Wilson’s attorneys may be entitled to receive in connection for the appeal. |  | Cathay Cathay, Inc. et al. v. Vindalu, LLC et al., Nos. 13-337, 13-341 (March 17, 2016) | 13-337, 13-341 | These consolidated appeals arise out of a civil action that the plaintiffs, Cathay Cathay, Inc. and Surf & Turf Grille, Inc., filed in the Superior Court against the defendant, Rouse Providence, LLC (Rouse), and its two co-defendants who are not parties to this appeal. The Supreme Court previously entertained another appeal arising from this action in Cathay Cathay, Inc. v. Vindalu, LLC, 962 A.2d 740 (R.I. 2009). Returning to the Court again this term, the plaintiffs first appeal from the entry of partial final judgment in the Superior Court in favor of Rouse. Before this Court, the plaintiffs argue that the Superior Court justice erred when she determined that the plaintiffs’ contractual claims against Rouse were tried and then adjudicated by another trial justice when he granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief against one of Rouse’s co-defendants. After its careful review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the contractual claims were neither tried nor adjudicated and thus that the entry of partial final judgment was improper. The Supreme Court vacated the entry of partial final judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for trial on the remaining claims against the defendants. In a separate appeal, consolidated for the purposes of this opinion, the plaintiffs challenge the denial in part of their motion to file a second amended complaint in this case. The Supreme Court declined to address this issue because the denial of the motion to amend the complaint constituted an interlocutory order unsuitable for immediate appellate review. |  |
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